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Abstract
Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large num-
ber of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the
price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the wide applicability of our framework through
instantiations for several well-studied models, including simultaneous single-item auctions, rout-
ing games, and greedy combinatorial auctions. We identify conditions under which the POA of
large games is better than that of worst-case instances. Our results also give new senses in which
simple auctions can perform almost as well as optimal ones in realistic settings.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is an indispensable tool for reasoning about a wide range of computer science applica-
tions, such as routing, network formation, bandwidth pricing, and automated auctions. However, the
game-theoretic models relevant for these applications differ from the classical examples that grace
the opening pages of every textbook on the subject. Most of the latter are games with only few,
or even two, players — the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Matching Pennies, and so on.
This focus on games with a small number players dates back to the origin of game theory [31]. In
typical computer science applications, the number of players is large.
Are games with many players harder or easier to understand than those with few? One answer
is “harder:” the normal-form representation of a game grows exponentially with the number of
players k, and k-player games can be viewed as special cases of (k + 1)-player games. But for many
natural classes of games, we might hope that the answer is “easier:” perhaps the influence of each
player on the outcome is small, which in turn makes their optimal behavior easy to characterize. For
example, in many market settings with a large number of small players, the action of a single player
has only negligible effect on prices, and thus players can be accurately modeled as “price-takers.”
The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the inefficiency of
equilibria — the price of anarchy (POA) — in well-motivated classes of games with a large number
of players. In all of the specific models studied in this paper, worst-case POA is well understood.
These bounds, like any worst-case bounds, tend to be overly pessimistic and are determined by
pathological examples. Our aim here is to show qualitatively better POA bounds for these models,
assuming only that the games are “large.”
Our framework and results (detailed below) are chosen with four desiderata in mind. First, the
framework should be general enough to encompass many different models in which the POA has been
studied. Second, the framework should be relatively easy to use, to maximize its future applicability.
Third, the framework should provide new insights about which mechanisms are likely to perform
well in realistic settings. Finally, the framework should differentiate notions of ”largeness” that lead
to smaller inefficiency from those that do not.
1.1 Summary of Results
We define (λ, µ)-smooth in the large game sequences, and show that the POA of games in such
a sequence approaches λ/(1 − µ). This notion inherits the generality and robustness of previous
smoothness definitions [22, 23, 29, 30]: many different applications are amenable to a smoothness-
type analysis, and the resulting POA bounds apply to a wide range of equilibria, such as correlated
and Bayes-Nash equilibria.
We also propose an intuitive sufficient condition for a game sequence to be smooth in the large.
This condition is relatively easy to apply, and most of our specific results are derived from it. The idea
is to formalize the intuition that large games are more efficient because no individual can significantly
affect the game’s outcome. Precisely, one defines for each player an approximate utility, intended to
represent the utility a player expects to receive after incorrectly assuming that his strategy has no
effect on his utility.1 The sufficient condition requires that the approximate utility is (λ, µ)-smooth
with respect to the actual game. We prove that if this condition is satisfied, then the game sequence
is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large.
We apply our definitions to obtain POA bounds for “large versions” of a number of well-studied
models. Our flagship example is simultaneous single-item auctions where we obtain full efficiency
in the large even with general combinatorial valuations. We then demonstrate the versatility of our
1This is purely for the sake of analysis; the resulting POA bound applies to the equilibria of the actual game.
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framework by applying it to routing games. In the appendix, we also consider greedy combinatorial
auctions.
Simultaneous Uniform Price Auctions. We highlight the application of our framework to
combinatorial auctions. First, we show that in a “large” combinatorial auction setting, running
separate simultaneous uniform price auctions for each type of good in the market leads to a fully
efficient allocation in the limit. Specifically, we consider a setting where a fixed set of m different
goods, each of some supply, are auctioned off to a set of n bidders. Bidders have combinatorial
valuations over sets of allocated units of different items and we assume that they only want some
fixed number r of units from each individual good. We consider the following way of growing the
market: the number of players increases, the number of units of supply of each good increases with
the number of players, and each player fails to arrive in the market with some probability δ > 0.
Under these conditions we show that the worst-case expected welfare of Bayes-Nash equilibria of
these games converges at a rate of O(1 − 1/√n) to the expected optimal welfare. We make no
assumptions about the distributions of the buyers, other than that they are independent.
Our result should be contrasted with worst-case price of anarchy bounds for simultaneous second
price auctions (a special case of simultaneous uniform price auctions), where for general combinatorial
valuations with complementarities (even when a player wants at most one unit of each item), such
an auction cannot achieve better than an O(
√
m)-approximation in the worst-case. A striking
feature of this result is that full efficiency is obtained even though bidders are forced to report
far fewer parameters (polynomial in m) than are present in their (combinatorial) valuations. Thus
the near-optimal equilibria are not “truthful outcomes” in any sense. This highlights the power of
adopting a smoothness-based framework — we can prove convergence to full efficiency without ever
characterizing what these near-optimal equilibria look like.
Congestion Games. For a second application, we apply our framework to congestion games
and show a smooth convergence of the price of anarchy of atomic congestion games to their non-
atomic counterparts, as the number of players grows large. Specifically, we analyze the price of
anarchy of sequence of congestion games where each player controls a smaller and smaller fraction of
a fixed traffic rate. We show through the smoothness approach that the price of anarchy converges
at a multiplicative error of 1+o(1/n) to the non-atomic price of anarchy for the same class of latency
functions, where n is the number of players and assuming that each player controls a flow of 1/n.
The POA in nonatomic congestion games is generally much smaller than in atomic congestion games
(see e.g. [21]).
Greedy Combinatorial Auctions. A second type of auction we analyze with our framework
is a greedy combinatorial auction setting where each player is interested in a specific bundle of items
of size at most d and each bidder might want many copies of his bundle, but at most some fixed
constant r. Similar to the previous auction setting, there is some fixed set of m different goods
and each good is in some supply. We consider the auction where each player submits a set of r
marginal bids for his interest set. The bids are ordered in decreasing order and bids are allocated in
decreasing order as long as they are satisfiable, i.e., no item in the interest set has run out of supply.
We show that as the number of players grows and the supply of each good grows in expectation, but
is sufficiently uncertain, then the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy of the greedy mechanism converges
to d, which matches the algorithmic approximation of the algorithm without incentives.
Discussion of Results. We believe that our results are interesting for several reasons. First, we
prove that in many of the game-theoretic models in which the POA has been studied, the POA
in large games is much smaller than the worst-case bound. In some (but not all) cases, the POA
approaches 1 as the game grows large and full efficiency is recovered in the limit. We suspect that
our better POA bounds are more relevant for many computer science settings, which often feature
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a large number of “small” players in uncertain environments.
Second, our results have interesting implications for mechanism design. Theoretically optimal
mechanisms can be relatively complex — for example, when bidders demand multiple units of a
good, the welfare-maximizing (i.e., VCG) mechanism charges different prices for different units of
the good. Some of our results give a new sense in which “simple” mechanisms can be near-optimal.
For example, we prove that the (theoretically suboptimal) uniform-price mechanism has welfare
approaching that of the VCG mechanism as the market grows large.
Third, our results demonstrate that not all notions of a “large game” are equivalent. Our analysis
framework identifies features of a setting, including plausible types of environmental uncertainty, that
lead to more efficient equilibria. We elaborate on this point when we discuss our techniques, below.
1.2 Our Techniques
At first blush, it may sound obvious that letting the number of players tend to infinity results in a
“limit game” with more efficient equilibria. But this point turns out to be delicate: this intuition is
true for some but not all natural ways of defining “large” games. We use our framework to guide us
to assumptions that plausibly hold in real-world settings and also lead to improved POA bounds.
For example, in simultaneous uniform price auctions, it is not enough to merely assume that the
number of players is sufficiently large — we are assuming no prior distribution, so one can always
add “dummy players” to an arbitrary game without affecting the equilibria (or the POA). A similar
comment applies even in an IID Bayesian setting if we also assume merely that the number of players
and available items tend to infinity. This is illustrated in the following example, taken from [28].
Example. (Inefficiency without randomness) Consider a setting where k units of a good are auc-
tioned off to n = k bidders. Each bidder wants at most two units. The value of each bidder for
the first unit is the maximum of two random samples drawn uniformly from the interval [2, 3] and
independently for each bidder. The marginal value for the second unit is the minimum of the two
samples. The units are sold via a uniform price auction: each bidder submits two marginal bids,
the k highest marginal bids win and each bidder pays the highest losing marginal bid for each unit
he won. We next show that the following bidding is an equilibrium of the game, for any k: each
bidder submits his higher marginal truthfully and 0 as his second marginal. The uniform price is 0
and each bidder derives utility v1i . For any bidder to get a second unit he needs to bid at least 2,
which would increase the uniform price to at least 2 on both units. The increase in payment is 4,
while the increase in value is at most 3, hence not profitable. Under this equilibrium the expected
welfare is k · 2.67. The expected optimal welfare is the expected sum of the highest k of 2k samples
from U [2, 3], which is approximately k · 2.75 as k grows large.
To make progress, we build on an idea introduced previously in the economics literature [28],
namely probabilistic demand. The idea here is to introduce demand uncertainty by randomly remov-
ing bidders with a small constant probability. This corroborates well with many real-world auction
settings (especially in automated auctions, where the participants might well be chosen by a search
engine’s heuristic matching algorithm), where bidders cannot be sure who else will show up and be
chosen to participate in an auction.
For another example, in combinatorial greedy auctions, we prove that the demand uncertainty
that we use above is not enough to improve the POA as much as one would expect. Intuitively, the
reason is that the presence or absence of a single bidder can have cascading effects on the demands
of other bidders whose demand sets intersect his. On the other hand, we prove positive results
with supply uncertainty by randomly varying the number of units of each good. Again, for many
automated auctions (e.g., where the number of goods might correspond to a number of queries for
a given term or the number of views of a page), this is a quite palatable assumption.
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At a technical level, our framework indicates which assumptions lead to better POA bounds
and which do not. The primary challenge in applying our framework is to define the approximate
utility of players such that it both approximates the actual utility and is smooth with respect to
the actual game. Designing these approximate utilities requires understanding the approximations
players may reasonably sustain regarding the game they are playing in large markets (again, this is
for the analysis only, not a behavorial assumption).2 For example, in auctions, in our analysis, we
think of players as ignoring the impact of their bids on the prices. Our framework works only when
the relevant parameters of the approximate utility functions approach the real utility functions in
the actual game, and at this level it is analytically tractable to identify which types of uncertainties
are sufficient and which are not.
Finally, our framework demands that the approximate utilities are smooth with respect to the
actual game. This step requires some technical finesse: the smoothness arguments work by defining
deviations for players that are functions of the types. Often, the deviations in auctions ask players to
bid high values on their optimal allocation. However, in the presence of noise, the optimal allocation
is a random variable. One technical contribution is to circumvent this difficulty by re-interpreting
the noise as a type uncertainty in a Bayesian game. This step is also possible (with good smoothness
parameters) only for some types of noise. In particular, Section B.3 shows that supply uncertainty is
not sufficient to obtain fully efficient equilibria in simlutaneous uniform price auctions. Intuitively,
the reason is that supply uncertainty makes it hard for bidders to figure out what items to bid on
in the deviation, thus introducing a search friction that persists as the market grows large.3
1.3 Related Work
Most previous work in computer science that concentrates specifically on games with many players
is motivated by complexity concerns. For example, the literature on “compact representations” of
games proposes succinct descriptions, with size polynomial in the number of players, that are well
structured but still rich enough to capture many interesting applications. See [14, 6, 27] and the
references therein for many examples. These references also discuss the well-studied problem of
computing equilibria efficiently in compactly represented multi-player games.
A few recent works in computer science and operations research study somewhat related notions
of “large games,” with different goals than ours. Kearns et al. [15] study games where no player’s
action can affect the payoff of any other player by more than a small amount, and give an algorithm
that computes a correlated equilibrium while satisfying strong incentive and privacy guarantees.
This result was strengthen for large routing games in [20]. Pai et al. [18] discuss the extent to which
“folk theorems” of repeated games continue to hold in such large games. Recent work that analyzes
“mean field equilibria” (e.g. [12]) effectively assumes that players are small enough that each player
can model the rest as a population, rather than at an individual level. Classical work in game theory
on “nonatomic games” (e.g. [25] and [2]) also has this flavor.
There is an old if modest tradition in economics of considering large markets; see [19] for an early
example and Kalai [13] for work on the robustness of equilibria in large games. Closest to our work
is that of Swinkels [28] who studies a single-good uniform price auction with decreasing marginal
valuations and with demand and supply uncertainties under the same large market assumptions that
we make. Our work uses a similar intuition regarding the insensitivity of prices in conditions of noisy
demand or supply and combines it with techniques taken from the price of anarchy framework to
2Though as a side benefit, our results also imply that playing equilibria with respect to the approximate utilities
will form an approximate equilibria of the large market that retains all the efficiency properties we prove. Conceivably,
this could be an accurate model of how players behave in large and complex games.
3More generically, supply uncertainty only works for settings where the deviation in the smoothness proof depends
only on the valuation of the individual bidder and is independent of the valuation profile of other bidders.
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generalize the setting for which full optimality is achieved. Our simultaneous uniform price auction
result generalizes the supply uncertainty result of [28] to allow for heterogeneous goods and our
greedy auction result generalizes the demand uncertainty result of [28] by allowing bids on bundles
of items, rather than single items (the uniform price auction is a special case of the greedy auction
for d = 1). Our framework also allows us to relax some technical assumptions made in [28] regarding
the valuation distributions.
The perspective and goals of these works in the economics literature differ from ours in several
predictable ways. Their emphasis has been on understanding what equilibria “look like”, and ideally
solving for them explicitly (if not in large finite games, then at least “in the limit”); a technically
difficult subproblem that often arises in this approach is to prove that the equilibria of large finite
games approach the equilibria of a “limit game”. Because we care about equilibria only through their
objective function value, we can bypass the problem of characterizing equilibria and their limits, and
instead argue directly about the approximation guarantees obtained. In addition, all previous work
in economics on efficiency in large games considered only the special case of full efficiency in the limit,
as in our result on uniform-price auctions. No previous work considered models where inefficiency
persists in the limit, as with several of our other results. Our smoothness-based framework is general
enough to cover both situations with a common analysis.
Other perspectives of large markets were studied recently by Alvzedo and Budish [3], who for-
malized the notion of “strategyproof in the large” mechanisms, where truthtelling constitutes an
approximate equilibrium as many players arrive in the market and submit bids drawn from the same
distribution. Our work differs, in that we don’t need to make such symmetric strategy assumptions
and allows for mechanisms where efficiency can be achieved in the limit even though truthtelling is
not necessarily a limit behavior.
The worst-case POA (without the largeness assumption) is well understood in all of the models
that we study. For the POA of uniform-price auctions and simultaneous item auctions, see [7, 5, 11,
10, 17, 8] . For the POA of greedy combinatorial auctions, see [16]. For the POA of atomic routing
games, see [1]. For the POA of nonatomic routing games, see [24].
2 Preliminaries: Mechanisms, Bayes NE and Price of Anarchy
In this work, we present a framework to study the efficiency of games in the large. We apply this
framework to a variety of games, including cost minimization games, value maximization games,
and welfare maximization in mechanisms. For the sake of brevity, we present our framework for the
case of mechanisms for combinatorial auction settings. Analogous frameworks exist for the other
settings, and we defer their presentation to Appendix D.
Consider a market with n bidders and m items. Each player i ∈ [n] has a valuation function
vi : 2
[m] → R+, that assigns a value for each possible allocation of items. We will denote the set of
possible valuations for player i with Vi and the set of valuation profiles with V = V1 × . . .× Vn.
A mechanism M constists of a triple ({Si}ni=1, {xi}ni=1, {Pi}ni=1). Si is a strategy space for each
player (and S = S1 × . . . × Sn). xi : S → 2[m] is an allocation function that maps a strategy profile
to an allocation of items to player i, such that x(s) = (x1(s), . . . , xn(s)) is feasible (no two items
are allocated to different players). Pi : S → R+ is a payment function. A bidder’s utility for an
allocation is his value minus his payment, i.e., ui(s; vi) = vi(xi(s)) − Pi(s). We will be interested in
analyzing the social welfare of an equilibrium strategy profile s ∈ S, which is the total value of the
resulting allocation:
SW (s; v) =
∑n
i=1 vi(xi(s)) (1)
The optimal feasible allocation for valuation profile v will be denoted by Opt(v), i.e. Opt(v) =
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maxx is feasible
∑n
i=1 vi(xi). The revenue of a mechanism is the sum of the payments, i.e., R(s) =∑n
i=1 Pi(s).
We will consider a Bayesian setting in which each player’s valuation vi is drawn independently
from some distribution Fi. A strategy function for agent i is a (possibly randomized) mapping µi
from Vi to Si, which we think of as a specification of the strategy to use given a valuation. A
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) is a profile of strategy functions such that no single agent can
increase her expected utility (over randomization in types and strategies) by unilaterally modifying
her strategy. Formally, the profile of strategy functions µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) is a BNE if for all i, all
valuations vi ∈ Vi, and all alternative strategies s′i ∈ Si, we have
Ev−i∼F−i [ui(µi(vi), µ−i(v−i); vi)] ≥ Ev−i∼F−i [ui(s′i, µ−i(v−i); vi)].
Note that the non-Bayesian notion of Nash Equilibrium is a special case of the above, in which every
distribution Fi is a point mass.
The Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy (BNE-PoA) of a mechanismM is the worst-case ratio between
the expected optimal welfare and the expected welfare at equilibrium, over all type distributions and
all BNE. That is,
BNE-PoA = maxF maxµ
Ev∼F [Opt(v)]
Ev∼F [SW (µ(v);v)]
, (2)
where the maximum over strategy functions µ is taken over all BNE for distribution profile F .
3 Smoothness in the Large
Sequence of mechanisms. We will typically work with a sequence of mechanisms {Mn}∞n=1,
indexed by the number of participating players n. For shorter notation we will write {xn} to denote
the sequence {xn}∞n=1.
In a sequence of mechanisms {Mn}, everything will be changing parametrically with the number
of players, such as the set of items mn, the strategy spaces Sn = (Sn1 , . . . , S
n
n), the allocation
functions xn = (xn1 , . . . , x
n
n), the payment functions P
n = (Pn1 , . . . , P
n
n ) and the valuation profile
space Vn = (Vn1 , . . . ,Vnn ). We will also denote with Optn(·) the optimal welfare, with Rn()˙ the
revenue and with uni the utility of player i in mechanism Mn. For the moment one can imagine
arbitrary ways for the mechanism to grow; in subsequent sections we give specific conditions for how
the market should grow for our framework to be applicable.
Smoothness in the large. For finite games, Roughgarden [22] introduced the notion of smooth-
ness as a method for bounding inefficiency of equilibria. The smoothness approach proceeds by
exploring specific deviations, instead of characterizing the (potentially complex) structure of equi-
libria. This approach was specialized to the mechanism design setting via the notion of smooth
mechanisms by Syrgkanis and Tardos [30]. We extend the notion of smoothness to large games.
In what follows we present the specific extension in the context of mechanism design (i.e., large
mechanisms), but the framework is widely applicable and the reader is directed to Appendix D for
the formulation of the framework in general games. Intuitively, a sequence of mechanisms is said to
be (λ, µ)-smooth in the large if for any ǫ, and a sufficiently large number of players, each player i
has a special strategy that allows him to acquire a λ · (1− ǫ) fraction of his valuation for his optimal
set of items, by paying no more than µ times the current price paid for these items.
Definition 1 (Smooth in the large). A sequence of mechanisms {Mn} is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large
if for any ǫ > 0, there exists n(ǫ) <∞, such that for any n > n(ǫ), for any vn ∈ Vn, for each i ∈ [n],
there exists a strategy s∗,ni ∈ Sni , such that for any sn ∈ Sn:∑n
i=1 u
n
i (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; v
n
i ) ≥ λ(1− ǫ)Optn(vn)− µ · Rn(sn) (3)
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The following theorem shows that if a sequence of mechanisms is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large, for
some λ, µ ≥ 0, then its price of anarchy as n → ∞ is at most max{1,µ}λ . Moreover, it implies that
for any sufficiently large but finite market of size n the price of anarchy of all Bayes-Nash equilibria
is at most a 1 + ǫ(n) multiplicative factor away from the limit price of anarchy, where the rate
of convergence of ǫ(n) to 0 will depend on the application and can be derived from the proof of
smoothness in the large.
Theorem 2. If a sequence of games is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large then
lim supn→∞BNE-PoA
n ≤ max{1,µ}λ .
I.e., for any ǫ there exists a market size n(ǫ) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), every Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the mechanism Mn with value distributions F1 × . . . × Fn has expected social welfare at least
(1− ǫ) λmax{1,µ} of the expected optimal welfare.
Proof. By (λ, µ)-smoothness in the large, for any ǫ there exists a market size n(ǫ) such that for any
n ≥ n(ǫ) the mechanism Mn is a (λ(1− ǫ), µ)-smooth mechanism, as defined in [30]. Therefore, by
the results in [30], the BNE-PoAn is at most max{1,µ}λ(1−ǫ) . The theorem then follows.
3.1 Main Technique: Smooth Approximate Utility Functions
We present the notion of a (λ, µ)-smooth approximate utility function sequence with respect to a
sequence of mechanisms {Mn}.
Definition 3 (Smooth approximate utility). Let Uni : S
n × Vi → R+ be a utility function for player
i ∈ [n], and let Un = (Un1 , . . . , Unn ) be a vector of utility functions. A sequence {Un} is a sequence of
(λ, µ)-smooth approximate utility functions for the sequence of mechanisms {Mn} if the following
two properties are satisfied:
1. (Approximation) The approximate utility Uni converges to the true utility u
n
i uniformly over
sn ∈ Sn and vi ∈ Vi. I.e., for any ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞, such that for any n > n(ǫ), for
any i ∈ [n] and vi ∈ Vi, and for any sn ∈ Sn:
‖uni (sn; vi)− Uni (sn; vi)‖ < ǫ. (4)
2. (Smoothness) For each mechanism Mn in the sequence, the approximate utility satisfies the
following (λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to Mn: For any n, for any v ∈ Vn, for any
i ∈ [n], there exists a strategy s∗,ni ∈ Sni , such that for any strategy profile sn ∈ Sn:∑n
i=1 U
n
i (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; vi) ≥ λOptn(v)− µ · Rn(sn) (5)
We show that if a sequence of mechanisms admits a (λ, µ)-smooth approximate utility sequence,
and if its optimal social welfare increases at least at the same asymptotic rate as the number of
players, then this sequence of mechanisms is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large. The proof is rather straight-
forward given the definitions, and is deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 4. If a sequence of mechanisms {Mn} admits (λ, µ)-smooth approximate utility functions,
and Optn(t) = Ω(n), then {Mn} is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large.
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4 Simultaneous Uniform Price Auctions
We consider a setting with a growing number of n bidders and a fixed number of m different (types
of) goods. There are knj units of each good j ∈ [m] which grows as Ω(n) with the number of players.4
Each player i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi : Nm → [0,H], that assigns a value for each possible
bundle, depending on the number of units of each good. These functions are bounded in their
demand for the number of units of each good. Specifically, let xji denote the number of units of good
j allocated to player i, and let xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i ) be an allocation vector for player i. Then there is a
publically known constant r such that: vi(xi) = vi(min{x1i , r}, . . . ,min{xmi , r}). We will also assume
that these valuations are bounded away from zero for any non-empty allocation, i.e. vi(xi) ≥ ρ > 0
for every non-zero xi.
The units of each good j ∈ [m] are simultaneously and independently sold via the means of a
uniform price auction. The auctioneer solicits r bids bj,1i ≥ . . . ≥ bj,ri from each bidder i for each
good j, referred as marginal bids. All bids of good j (from all players) are ordered in a decreasing
order, and each of the first knj bids wins a unit. In the case of ties, bidders are processed in a random
order, and all tying bids of a bidder are allocated sequentially in order until the supply of the good
runs out. Every player is charged the highest losing marginal bid for good j for every unit of good j
allocated to him. We will assume that no bid exceeds some fixed number B; i.e., bj,xi < B for every
i, j, x. Since we assumed that vi(xi) ≤ H, it is a weakly dominated strategy for a player to bid more
than H on an individual marginal bid, though our formulation allows even for B > H, as long as
B doesn’t grow with the market . We will denote by Mn an instance of the simultaneous uniform
price auction among n players.
Notably, the above auction is not truthful for many reasons. First, the auction format is not even
rich enough to allow players to express their true valuations, as they are forced to place additively
separable bids on the different goods. second, even for a single type of good, a uniform-price auction
is not truthful for players with multi-unit demands. Nonetheless, we will show that in large markets,
under a particular type of demand uncertainty — where each bidder “fails to arrive” with constant
probability — all equilibria achieve full efficiency.
Theorem 5 (Full Efficiency in the Limit). In the setting described above, if each player fails to
arrive in the market with probability δ, then the implied sequence of mechanisms is (1, 1)-smooth in
the large; hence full efficiency is achieved in the limit. Moreover, the fraction of the optimal welfare
achieved at equilibrium converges to 1 at a rate of 1−O
(
1√
n
)
.
Crucially, the fact that we recover full efficiency in the large is not trivial in our setting. The result
is sensitive, for example, to the type of noise in the system, and different noise may be required in
different settings. The noisy arrival of players can be seen as a type of demand uncertainty. In prior
work of Swinkels [28], and in Section C which generalizes the prior work of Swinkels to combinatorial
auctions with fixed demand sets, the uncertainty instead regards the supply: namely the probability
that the number of units of the good equals any fixed number goes to 0 as the market grows large.
For these settings, supply uncertanty is sufficient to recover full efficiency in the limit. In contrast,
for simultaneous uniform price auctions, supply uncertainty can lead to a constant factor inefficiency
even in the limit. In particular, it sustains a “search friction” in the limit: players do not know which
items will have higher supply and thereby cannot decide which items to target. At equilibrium, their
supply prediction ends up leading to constant factor inefficiencies that do not vanish. A concrete
4In the full version, we show an alternative proof of the theorem that establishes the same result even without the
assumption that knj = Ω(n) (rather assumes that k
n
j → ∞). However, that proof shows directly that the mechanism
is (1, 1)-smooth in the large, rather than going through the existence of (1, 1)-smooth approximate utilities.
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counter example showing that supply uncertainty may lead to constant inefficiency in simultaneous
uniform price auctions appears as Example B.3 in Appendix B.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 5 At the high level, Theorem 5 is established by showing that
the simultaneous uniform price auction where each player fails to arrive with probability δ admits
(1, 1)-smooth approximate utility functions. The full proof is deferred to Appendix B.
The approximate utility functions we define will have the following intuitive interpretation: each
player i looks at the (k+1)-th highest bid at each auction excluding his own bids. Denote this with
P−ij . This is the price that the other players would have paid for each unit of good j had player i
not been in the market. In player i’s approximate utility, he has the delusion that this is also the
price he faces; i.e., any marginal bid that he submits that surpasses the price P−ij will win a unit
at price P−ij .
5 In the actual market this is obviously not true: to win x ∈ {1, . . . , r} units, player i
actually needs to exceed the x-th lowest winning bid in his absence, and his price will be equal to
this bid which may be greater than his imagined price of P−ij . However, as we shall soon show, with
the proposed noise in the system, the price P−ij is ”sufficiently random” that it is distributed almost
identically to this x-th lowest winning bid for any constant x.
In what follows we present some of the technical challenges and techniques in our proof. Following
the framework of smooth approximate utilities, we first sketch the proof of the approximation and
then the smoothness of the approximate utility functions described above.
Approximation. We first show (in Lemma 9) that the player’s utility from any bid vector b
converges to his approximate utility, as the market grows large. Technically, the two utilities differ
either when the allocation is different or when the price paid is different. The allocation differs only
when some of the player’s marginal bids are among the k + 1 − r and k + 1 highest bids,6 since
this is the only case where the player may believe that his marginal bid is a winning bid (under
his delusional utility) while it is actually a losing bid (under his true utility). However, due to the
random arrival, for any bid b, the probability that the number of bids above b is equal to some
number x goes to 0 as x → ∞. Thus, the probability of any of these events goes to 0. Now,
since there is only a constant number of these events (by the assumption that r is constant), the
probability of any bad event occurring goes to 0 (by the union bound). Finally, we show that the
difference in price paid also goes to zero. Technically, the distributions of the (k + 1)-th and the
(k + 1 + x)-th highest bids are identical for any x ∈ [−r, r]. Thus, their expectation converges to
zero as well (as they are bounded random variables).
Smoothness. The other part of the proof (Lemmas 7, 8) shows that these delusional utilities
satisfy the (1, 1)-smoothness property. Observe, that under this delusion a player believes that he
can always grab his optimal set of items at the current price in which they are sold. This is essentially
the (1, 1)-smoothness property. However, there are two crucial subtleties that need to be handled
carefully. First, the prices of the goods are random, thus unknown to the player. Second, the optimal
set of items for a player is also random, as it depends on who arrives in the market (which is not
observed by the player when he decides his bid vector). The first problem is bypassed by observing
that since these are threshold price mechanisms, the player can simply bid sufficiently high (even
overbid). Specifically, if a player’s optimal allocation is xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i ), where x
j
i denotes the
number of units of good j, then by bidding sufficiently high on the xji highest marginal bids on each
good j, he will almost surely win the items, or otherwise some price must be so high that we can
charge the welfare loss to some other allocated player. We will show that bidding vi(xi) as the first
xji marginal bids on each good j is sufficiently high to establish our (1, 1)-smoothness argument.
To bypass the second problem, we observe that the utility of any player under this game is lower
5A bid that is equal to P−ij will pass through the tie-breaking rule.
6In the actual proof we also take care of tie-breaking.
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bounded by the utility if he can bid even when he doesn’t arrive, but has value of 0. The latter game
is a simultaneous uniform price auction with no noisy demand, but with a Bayesian uncertainty
on the values . Thus we will use a technique similar to the one used to show that smoothness for
complete information games implies smoothness for games with Bayesian uncertainty in the values
[23, 29, 30]. In particular, the smoothness deviation samples an arrival vector from the distribution
and uses this random sample as a proxy for the true arrival vector, targeting the optimal bundle
under this random sample.
5 Congestion Games
We will apply the notion of smoothness in the large for general games (which we formally present in
Appendix D) to network routing games. An (unsplittable flow) routing game is specified by a fixed
network H and a set of n players. Each player i has a type corresponding to a source node ui, a
destination node vi, and an amount of flow fi. A strategy si of player i is a path from ui to vi in
H. Each edge e of H has a corresponding cost function ce : [0, 1] → R, where ce(x) is interpreted
as the cost (or delay) of traveling on edge e given that a total flow of x is being routed on that
edge. Typically, each cost ce is a continuous non-decreasing function. For a fixed network H, let G
n
denote an unsplittable flow routing game with n players, in which fi = 1/n for each player i. We
can then think of {Gn} as a sequence of games, growing large in the sense that individual players
control a vanishingly small fraction of the total flow.
For game Gn (i.e., a particular choice of n), the cost function for each player is: cni (s; ti) =∑
e∈si ce
(
ne(s)
n
)
, where ne(s) = |{j : e ∈ sj}| is the number of players that select, as their strategy,
a path that includes edge e. For this game, we consider the following approximate cost function:
Cni (s; ti) =
∑
e∈si
ce
(
ne(s−i)
n
)
, (6)
where ne(s−i) = |{j 6= i : e ∈ sj}|. Essentially, this approximation corresponds to a player ignoring
his own effect on the delay of a link when calculating his total delay for the links that he uses.
Though this assumption might lead to large errors in a small game, it is a good approximation in a
large game context where each individual player controls only a vanishing fraction of the traffic.
Lemma 6. If cost functions are continuous and satisfy: x · ce(y) ≤ λ ·x · ce(x)+µ · y · ce(y) then the
sequence of functions {Cni } defined in Equation (6) is a valid sequence of (λ, µ)-smooth approximate
cost functions for the sequence of congestion games {Gn}. (proof in Appendix E)
For example, when the edge cost functions are affine, then the property in Lemma 6 is known
to hold for λ = 1 and µ = 14 , which allows us to conclude that congestion games with linear cost
functions are
(
1, 14
)
-smooth in the large. Thus, as long as Optn = Ω(n) (which occurs as long as
the linear coefficients of the cost functions are bounded away from 0), we conclude that the price of
anarchy converges to the well-known 4/3 bound for non-atomic routing games [24]. More generally,
polynomial latency functions satisfy the property for λ = 1 and µ = d(d+ 1)−(d+1)/d which leads to
a price of anarchy in the limit of Θ(d/ log(d)). This is in stark comparison with the price of anarchy
for atomic congestion games with degree d polynomial delay functions, which is Θ
(
(d/ log(d))d
)
.
Finally, if we also assume that the cost functions are L-lipschitz for some constant L, then the
proof of Lemma 6 implies that the convergence rate to the non-atomic price of anarchy is of the
order of 1/n, i.e. if the cost functions satisfy the property in Lemma 6 then for the sequence of
games BNE − PoAn = λ1−µ +O(1/n).
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4 : Since {Mn} admits (λ, µ)-smooth approximate utility functions {Un}, we
have that for any n and v ∈ Vn there exists strategies s∗,ni for each i ∈ [n] such that, for any s ∈ Sn,
n∑
i=1
Uni (s
∗,n
i , s−i; vi) ≥ λOptn(v)− µ · Rn(s).
By the approximation property of Uni we have that for any ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞ such that for
any n > n(ǫ): uni (s; vi) ≥ Uni (s; vi)− ǫ for any vi ∈ Vni and sn ∈ Sn. Thus:
n∑
i=1
uni (s
∗,n
i , s−i; vi) ≥ λOptn(v)− µ · Rn(s)− n · ǫ.
Since Optn(v) = Ω(n), for any v ∈ Vn, we can write Optn(v) ≥ ρ · n for some ρ > 0 and for
sufficiently large n. Thus we get:
n∑
i=1
uni (s
∗,n
i , s−i; vi) ≥
(
λ− ǫ
ρ
)
Opt
n(tn)− µ · Rn(s).
Therefore, for any δ > 0, we can pick ǫ appropriately small, such that λ− ǫρ ≥ λ(1− δ), which would
then yield the theorem.
B Simultaneous Uniform Price Auctions
Proof of Theorem 5. We will view the simultaneous uniform price auction with random arrivals
as an ex-ante mechanism Mn,δ, where the noise is endogenized in the rules of the mechanism and
then we will show that mechanismMn,δ is (1, 1)-smooth in the limit. We will refer to this mechanism
as simultaneous uniform price auction with endogenous δ-noisy demand.
Basic Notation. We first introduce some useful notation. We will denote with uni (b; vi) the
expected utility from a simultaneous uniform price auction where b = (b1, . . . , bn) and bi is a vector
of marginal bids bj,xi , with j ∈ [m] and x ∈ [r], satisfying the decreasing marginal bid property, i.e.
bj,xi is decreasing in x. We will denote with xi(b) the allocation of player i under bid profile b in
the simultaneous uniform price auction, which is a random variable (due to tie-breaking). For any
vector x, we will denote with θt(x), the t-th highest element in x. Thus θt(b
j) is the t-th highest
marginal bid at the uniform price auction for good j. Thus we can write:
uni (b; vi) = E

vi(xi(b))− ∑
j∈[m]
xji (b) · θknj +1(bj)

 (7)
where expectation is taken over xi(b).
We will denote with un,δi (b; vi) the expected utility of player i in the simultaneous uniform
price auction with noisy arrivals. Concretely, let zi be a {0, 1} random variable that equals 1
with probability 1 − δ, indicating whether player i arrived in the market and let z = (z1, . . . , zn).
Then
un,δi (b; vi) = E[zi · uni (b · z; vi)]. (8)
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Approximate Utility. We denote with Uni (b; vi) an approximate utility associated with the non-
noisy sequence of mechanisms, defined by the following allocation and payment rules (due to heavy
notation we avoid giving an algebraic description of Uni and only describe it in words). We remind
the reader the approximate utility is not the utility associated with any mechanism, and in fact would
not be feasible for all bidders simultaneously. It is simply a construct for the proof of smoothness, and
can be interpreted as an intuition for what’s guiding bidder behavior. To construct the approximate
utility , for each uniform price auction j ∈ [m], let θknj +1(b
j
−i) be the k
n
j + 1-highest marginal bid
excluding player i’s bids. Every marginal bid bj,xi > θknj +1(b
j
−i) wins a unit at auction j and bids
with bj,xi = θknj +1(b
j
−i) win with some probability that follows from the random tie-breaking rule
described in the beginning of the section. We will denote with Xi(b) the allocation function that is
implied by the above description, which is also a random variable due to the tie-breaking rule. For
every unit that a player i wins at auction j, she pays θknj +1(b
j
−i). Thus we can write the approximate
utility as:
Uni (b; vi) = E

vi(Xi(b))− ∑
j∈[m]
Xji (b) · θknj +1(b
j
−i)

 (9)
Then denote with Un,δi (b; vi) an approximate utility for the noisy arrival mechanism, which is
simply defined as:
Un,δi (b; vi) = E [zi · Uni (b · z; vi)] (10)
(1, 1)-Smoothness of Approximate Utility. We will first show that the approximate utility
Un,δi satisfies the (1, 1)-smoothness property with respect to the sequence of mechanisms Mn,δ.
To achieve this we will break it into two parts. First we will show that the approximate utility
Uni , satisfies the (1, 1)-smoothness property with respect to the non-noisy sequence of mechanism
Mn. Then we show generically, that if a sequence of utility functions Uni (s; vi), satisfy the (λ, µ)-
smoothness property with respect to a sequence of mechanisms Mn, then the sequence of utility
functions Un,δi (s; vi) = E [zi · Uni (s · z; vi)] satisfies the (λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to the
sequence of mechanismsMn,δ, which is the version ofMn where each player arrives with probability
δ. This completes the first part of the proof.
Lemma 7. Uni satisfies the (1, 1)-smoothness property with respect to the sequence of simultaneous
uniform price auctions Mn.
Proof. Consider a mechanism Mn in the sequence, valuation profile v ∈ Vn and let Optn(v) be
the optimal allocation. For each player i let x∗i denote his allocation in the welfare maximizing
allocation. Consider the following deviation b∗i for each player i: at each auction j ∈ [m], bid vi(x∗i )
as the first xj,∗i marginal bids and 0 on the remaining marginal bids.
Consider any bid profile b. There are two cases: either player i wins at least his optimal allocation
in his dellusion in which case he gets approximate utility:
Uni (b
∗
i , b−i) ≥ vi(x∗i )−
∑
j∈[m]
xj,∗i · θknj +1(b
j
−i)
or otherwise, there is at least one q ∈ [m] with xq,∗i > 0, for which θknq +1(bq−i) ≥ vi(x∗i ) and at which
player i wins strictly less than xq,∗i units. In that case, player i’s approximate utility is at least:
Uni (b
∗
i , b−i; vi) ≥ −
∑
j∈[m]
xj,∗i · θknj +1(b
j
−i) + θknq +1(b
q
−i) ≥ vi(x∗i )−
∑
j∈[m]
xj,∗i · θknj +1(b
j
−i)
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Hence, the latter inequality holds always. Summing up the inequality for each player and observing
that θknj +1(b
j
−i) ≤ θknj +1(bj) and
∑n
i=1 x
j,∗
i ≤ knj , we get:
n∑
i=1
Uni (b
∗
i , b−i; vi) ≥ Optn(v) −
∑
j∈[m]
knj · θknj +1(bj)
Now it is easy to see that Rn(b) =∑j∈[m] knj · θknj +1(bj), since at each uniform price auction, either
knj units were sold at a price of θknj +1(b
j) or θknj +1(b
j) = 0. This completes the proof.
Lemma 8. If Uni satsifies the (λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to a sequence of mechanisms
Mn, then Un,δi = Ez [zi · Uni (s · z; vi)] satisfies the (λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to the
sequence of mechanisms Mn,δ.
Proof. By smoothness of Uni with respect to Mn we know that for any valuation vector v, there
exists for each player i a deviation s∗i (v) such that for any strategy profile s:
n∑
i=1
Uni (s
∗
i (v), s−i; vi) ≥ λOptn(v)− µRn(s)
Observe that for any strategy profile s:
Uni (s
∗
i (v · z), s−i; vi) · zi ≥ Uni (s∗i (v · z), s−i; vi · zi)
Observe that:
Ez,z˜ [U
n
i (s
∗
i (v · (zi, z˜−i)), s−i · z−i; vi) · zi] = Ez,z˜ [Uni (s∗i (v · z˜), s−i · z−i; vi) · z˜i]
≥ Ez,z˜ [Uni (s∗i (v · z˜), s−i · z−i; vi · z˜i)]
Thus, for any strategy profile s, valuation profile v and arrival vector z:
∑
i∈[n]
Ez,z˜ [U
n
i (s
∗
i (v · (zi, z˜−i)), s−i · z−i; vi) · zi] ≥ Ez,z˜
[∑
i
Uni (s
∗
i (v · z˜), s−i · z−i; vi · z˜i)
]
≥ Ez,z˜ [λOptn(v · z˜)− µRn(s · z)]
Observe that: Ez˜ [U
n
i (s
∗
i (v · (zi, z˜−i)), s−i · z−i; vi) · zi] corresponds to the utility of a player under
the following deviation: random sample an arrival vector z˜−i, deviate assuming the arrival vector
(zi, z˜−i). This is a valid deviation for the noisy arrival mechanism Mn,δ and hence the above
inequality shows that Un,δi satisfies the (λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to Mn,δ.
Approximation. Now we move on to showing that Un,δi approximates u
n,δ
i as n→∞.
Lemma 9. For any valuation vi and for any bid profile sequence b
n:
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥un,δi (bn; vi)− Un,δi (bn; vi)∥∥∥ = 0 (11)
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Proof. We need to show that for any ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞ such that for any n > n(ǫ) and for
any bid profile b and for any valuation vi:
∆ =
∥∥∥un,δi (b; vi)− Un,δi (b; vi)∥∥∥ < ǫ
By triangle inequality we can lower bound the left hand side by:
∆ ≤ ‖E [vi(xi(b · z))− vi(Xi(b · z))]‖
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥E

∑
j∈[m]
Xji (b
j · z)θknj +1(b
j
−i · z−i)− xji (bj · z) · θknj +1(bj · z)


∥∥∥∥∥∥
The first part of the upper bound can be upper bounded by:
‖E [vi(xi(b · z))− vi(Xi(b · z))]‖ ≤ H · Pr [xi(b · z) 6= Xi(b · z)]
≤ H ·
∑
j∈[m]
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
The second part can also be upper bounded by the summation of the following two quantities:∥∥∥∥∥∥E

∑
j∈[m]
(
Xji (b
j · z)− xji (bj · z)
)
θknj +1(b
j
−i · z−i)


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥E

∑
j∈[m]
xji (b
j · z) ·
(
θknj +1(b
j
−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
The first quantity is upper bounded by:
B · r ·
∑
j∈[m]
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
since by assumption all marginal bids fall in a range [0, B] and the difference in the two allocations
of a player is at most r, by the r-demand assumption.
The second quantity is upper bounded by:
r ·
∑
j∈[m]
∥∥∥E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∥∥∥
since a player is allocated at most r units of each good j.
Thus, by the above reasoning, it suffices to show that there exists a finite n(ǫ) such that for any
n > n(ǫ) the following two properties hold for each uniform price auction j ∈ [m] and for any bid
profile bj
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤ ǫ
2m(B · r +H)∥∥∥E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ
2rm
Hence we break the proof in two lemmas:
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Lemma 10. For any uniform price auction j ∈ [m] and for any ǫ > 0, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞ such
that for any n > n(ǫ) and for any bid profile bj:
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
< ǫ (12)
Proof. We will show that the probability converges to 0 conditional on any draw of the random tie-
breaking priority order. Moroever, conditional on the tie-breaking rule it is without loss of generality
to assume that all marginal bids in bj are distinct and that there are no ties. The reason is that
conditional on the tie-breaking priority rule, we can add small quantities (much smaller than the
smallest difference between any two different marginal bids), to the input bids of the players, so as
to simulate the exact same allocation rule as would have been achieved by the original bid profile
and with the priority rule drawn (e.g. if player i was ordered first by the tie-breaker then add to all
his marginal bids n · δ, if he was ordered second then add (n− 1) · δ etc., similarly if any of his own
bids are identical then add even smaller δ′’s to differentiate them).
So suffices to prove that the probability goes to zero assuming that there are no two identical
bids in bj . Observe that the two allocations are different only when any of the marginal bids of
player i is among the k+1− r and the k+1 highest arriving marginal bids. If a marginal bid is not
among the k + 1− r and the k + 1 highest arriving marginal bids, then it is either not allocated by
both allocation rules because it is below the k + 1 highest arriving bid or is allocated by both rules
because it is among the k− r highest arriving bids and so adding player i’s bids will not push it out
of the allocation.
Let B(bj · z;x) denote the number of arriving marginal bids that are strictly above x. Thus we
can upper bound the desired probability by the union bound as:
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤
r∑
t=1
k+1∑
q=k+1−r
Pr[B(bj · z; bj,ti ) = q]
Now we can use the re-interpretation of a Lemma by Swinkels re-written in our terminology:
Lemma 11 (Swinkels [28]). For any x ∈ [0, B] and for any ǫ, there exists a q(ǫ) ≤ ∞ such that for
any q > q(ǫ) and for any bj :
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ ǫ (13)
Thus for sufficiently large n, knj is sufficiently large that each probability in the double summation
can be made smaller than any ǫ. Since the summation is over a constant number of quantities, the
double summation can also be made smaller than any ǫ for sufficiently large n. This completes the
proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 12. For any uniform price auction j ∈ [m] and for any ǫ > 0, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞ such
that for any n > n(ǫ) and for any bid profile bj:∥∥∥E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ (14)
Proof. Observe that θknj +1(b
j
−i · z−i) ≤ θknj +1(bj · z). Moreover, since player i submits at most r bids,
the knj + 1 highest bid among all bids except player i’s is at least the k
n
j + 1 + r highest bid among
all bids including player i’s. Thus:∥∥∥E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(b · z)
]∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥E [θknj +1+r(bj · z)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∥∥∥
We will now use the following reinterpretation of a Lemma of Swinkels, which we state in our
terminology:
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Lemma 13 (Swinkels [28]). For any x, x′ ∈ [knj , knj +r+1] the difference of the cummulative density
functions of the x-th and the x′-th highest arriving bid in a single uniform price auction converges
to 0 uniformly over x, x′ and bj, as knj →∞.
Since the CDFs of the random variables θknj +1+r(b
j · z−i) and θknj +1(bj · z) converge and since
the two quantities are bounded in [0, B], their expectations also converge and therefore there exists
n(ǫ) such that for any n > n(ǫ) and for any bj :∥∥∥E [θknj +1+r(bj) · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Combining Lemmas 10 and 20 establishes the assertion of Lemma 9.
B.1 Rates of Convergence for r = 1
Theorem 14. If r = 1 and knj ≥ 36·ρ
2·m2(B+H)2
ǫ2δ(1−δ) , then:
∑n
i=1 u
n,δ
i (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; v
n
i ) ≥ (1− ǫ)Optn(vn)−Rn(sn) (15)
and therefore the robust price of anarchy is at most 11−ǫ .
Equivalently if knj = Ω(n), and for constant ρ,m,B,H, δ, the welfare at every equilibrium (BNE,
CCE etc) is at least
(
1− o
(
1√
n
))
of the expected optimal welfare.
Lemma 15. If r = 1, then for any x ∈ [0, B] and for any ǫ, if q > 4
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) , then for any b
j :
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ ǫ (16)
Proof. Consider any bid profile bj , consisting of one bid per player. If less than q players are bidding
above x in bj, then Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] = 0 and the theorem follows. Thus in the bid profile that
maximizes the probability that we want to upper bound, there are t ≥ q players bidding above
x. Then the probability of the event of interest is equal to the probability that exactly q of these
players remain after the random deletion. Observe that the number of players among these bidders
that remain after the random deletion follows a Binomial distribution of t trials, each with success
probability (1− δ), denoted as B(t, 1− δ).
By the Berry-Esseen theorem [4, 9, 26] we know that the CDF of B(t, p) is approximated by
the CDF of the normal distribution with mean t · p and variance t · p · (1 − p), with an additive
error that is upper bounded by err ≤ p2+(1−p)2
2
√
np(1−p) . Denote with Φ(·) the CDF of the standard normal
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distribution. If X is a random variable distributed according to B(t, p), then
Pr[X = k] = Pr[X ≤ k]− Pr[X ≤ k − 1] ≤ Φ
(
k − t · p√
t · p · (1− p)
)
− Φ
(
k − 1− t · p√
t · p · (1− p)
)
+ 2 · err
=
1√
2π
∫ k−t·p√
t·p·(1−p)
k−1−t·p√
t·p·(1−p)
e−
z2
2 dz + 2 · err
≤ 1√
2π
1√
t · p · (1− p) + 2 · err
≤
(
1√
2π
+ p2 + (1− p)2
)
1√
t · p · (1− p)
≤ 2√
t · p · (1− p)
By the above we get that:
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ 2√
t · δ · (1− δ) ≤
2√
q · δ · (1− δ) (17)
For q ≥ 4
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) the latter probability is at most ǫ as desired.
Lemma 16. For r = 1, for any uniform price auction j ∈ [m] and for any ǫ > 0, if knj ≥ 16B
2
ǫ2δ(1−δ) ,
then for any bid profile bj: ∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (18)
Proof. Observe that θknj +1(b
j
−i · z−i) ≤ θknj +1(bj · z). Moreover, since player i submits one bid, the
knj + 1 highest bid among all bids except player i’s is at least the k
n
j + 2 highest bid among all bids
including player i’s. Thus:∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(b · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣E [θknj +2(bj · z)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣
Let Ft(·) denote the CDF of the t-th highest bid. Observe that if the number of arriving bids
strictly above x are less than t, i.e., B(bj ·z;x) < t, then both θt and θt+1 are at most x and therefore
the conditional CDFs of θt and θt+1 evaluated at x are both 1. If B(b
j · z;x) > t+ 1) then both θt
and θt+1 are strictly above x and therefore the conditional CDFs evaluated at x are both 0. Thus
the conditional CDFs differ only when B(bj · z;x) ∈ [t, t+ 1] and they differ by at most 1. Hence:
|Ft(x)− Ft+1(x)| ≤ Pr[B(bj · z;x) ∈ [t, t+ 1]] (19)
By Lemma 15, if t ≥ 16B2
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) , then Pr[B(b
j · z;x) = t] ≤ ǫ2B and Pr[B(bj · z;x) = t+1] ≤ ǫ2B , so by
the union bound |Ft(x)− Ft+1(x)| ≤ ǫB .
Last observe that:
E
[
θt(b
j · z)− θt+1(bj · z)
]
=
∫ B
0
1−Ft(x)dx−
∫ B
0
1−Ft+1(x)dx =
∫ B
0
Ft+1(x)−Ft(x)dx ≤ ǫ (20)
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Lemma 17. If knj ≥ 36·m
2(B+H)2
ǫ2δ(1−δ) then for any valuation vi and for any bid profile sequence b
n:
∥∥∥un,δi (bn; vi)− Un,δi (bn; vi)∥∥∥ ≤ ǫ (21)
Proof. By same reasoning as in Lemma 9, the difference in utilities is upper bounded by the following
quantity: ∑
j∈[m]
(B +H) Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
+
∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣
and:
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤ Pr[B(bj · z; bj,ti ) = knj ] + Pr[B(bj · z; bj,ti ) = knj + 1].
By the previous lemmas, if knj ≥ 36·m
2(B+H)2
ǫ2δ(1−δ) then:∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
3 ·m
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤ 2ǫ
3m(B +H)
which subsequently gives that the utility difference is at most ǫ.
B.2 Convergence Rate for General r
Theorem 18. If knj ≥ 16·m
2(B+H)2r8ρ2
ǫ2δ(1−δ) + r, then:
∑n
i=1 u
n,δ
i (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; v
n
i ) ≥ (1− ǫ)Optn(vn)−Rn(sn) (22)
and therefore the robust price of anarchy is at most 11−ǫ .
Equivalently if knj = Ω(n), and for constant ρ, r,m,B,H, δ, the welfare at every equilibrium (BNE
or CCE) is at least
(
1− o
(
1√
n
))
of the expected optimal welfare.
Lemma 19. For any x ∈ [0, B] and for any ǫ, if q > 4r2
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) , then for any b
j:
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ ǫ (23)
Proof. Consider any bid profile bj, consisting of at most r bids per player. For h ∈ [1, r] let Nh denote
the subset of players that under bj , they submit h bids above x and denote with nh = |Nh|. Observe
that there must exist at least one h∗ ∈ [1, r] such that nh∗ ≥ qr2 . Otherwise, we get:
∑r
h=1 nh · r < q
and therefore, there are in total less than q bids above x. Hence, the probability we want to upper
bound is 0.
Let Z−Nh∗ denote the number of arriving bids from players outside of Nh and ZNh∗ the number
of arriving bids from players in Nh. By the independent arrival assumption, conditional on the bid
profile bj , these two random variables are independent. Thus:
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] =
q∑
q′=1
Pr[Z−Nh∗ = q
′] · Pr[ZNh∗ = q − q′] ≤ max
z∈[1,q]
Pr[ZNh∗ = z] (24)
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Let X denote the number of players from Nh∗ that end up arriving. Observe that: Pr[ZNh∗ = z] =
Pr[X = zh∗ ], if z is a multiple of h
∗ and 0 otherwise. Thus:
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ max
x∈[1,⌊q/h∗⌋]
Pr[X = x]
If we denote with B(t, p) the binomial distribution of n trials each with success probability p, then
observe that X ∼ B(nh∗, 1− δ).
By the Berry-Esseen theorem [4, 9, 26] we know that the CDF of B(t, p) is approximated by
the CDF of the normal distribution with mean t · p and variance t · p · (1 − p), with an additive
error that is upper bounded by err ≤ p2+(1−p)2
2
√
np(1−p) . Denote with Φ(·) the CDF of the standard normal
distribution. If X is a random variable distributed according to B(t, p), then
Pr[X = k] = Pr[X ≤ k]− Pr[X ≤ k − 1] ≤ Φ
(
k − t · p√
t · p · (1− p)
)
− Φ
(
k − 1− t · p√
t · p · (1− p)
)
+ 2 · err
=
1√
2π
∫ k−t·p√
t·p·(1−p)
k−1−t·p√
t·p·(1−p)
e−
z2
2 dz + 2 · err
≤ 1√
2π
1√
t · p · (1− p) + 2 · err
≤
(
1√
2π
+ p2 + (1− p)2
)
1√
t · p · (1− p)
≤ 2√
t · p · (1− p)
By the above we get that:
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q] ≤ 2√
nh∗ · δ · (1− δ)
≤ 2r√
q · δ · (1− δ) (25)
For q ≥ 4r2
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) the latter probability is at most ǫ as desired.
Lemma 20. For any uniform price auction j ∈ [m] and for any ǫ > 0, if knj ≥ 4B
2r4
ǫ2δ(1−δ) , then for
any bid profile bj : ∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (26)
Proof. Moreover, since player i submits at most r bids, the knj +1 highest bid among all bids except
player i’s is at least the knj + 1 + r highest bid among all bids including player i’s. Thus:∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(b · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣E [θknj +1+r(bj · z)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣
Let Ft(·) denote the CDF of the t-th highest bid. Observe that if the number of arriving bids
strictly above x are less than t, i.e., B(bj · z;x) < t, then the conditional CDFs of t and t+ r highest
bid evaluated at x are both 1. If B(bj · z;x) > t+ r then the conditional CDFs evaluated at x are
both 0. Thus the conditional CDFs differ only when B(bj ·z;x) ∈ [t, t+ r] and they differ by at most
1. Hence:
|Ft(x)− Ft+r(x)| ≤ Pr[B(bj · z;x) ∈ [t, t+ r]] (27)
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By Lemma 15, if t ≥ 4B2r4
ǫ2·δ·(1−δ) , then for all x ∈ [t, t+ r], Pr[B(bj · z;x) = x] ≤ ǫBr , and by the union
bound: |Ft(x)− Ft+r(x)| ≤ ǫB .
Last observe that:
E
[
θt(b
j · z)− θt+r(bj · z)
]
=
∫ B
0
1−Ft(x)dx−
∫ B
0
1−Ft+r(x)dx =
∫ B
0
Ft+r(x)−Ft(x)dx ≤ ǫ (28)
Lemma 21. If knj ≥ 16·m
2(B+H)2r8
ǫ2δ(1−δ) + r then for any valuation vi and for any bid profile sequence b
n:
∥∥∥un,δi (bn; vi)− Un,δi (bn; vi)∥∥∥ = ǫ (29)
Proof. By same reasoning as in Lemma 9, the difference in utilities is upper bounded by the following
quantity:
r ·

∑
j∈[m]
(B +H) Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
+
∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣


and:
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤
r∑
t=1
knj +1∑
q=knj +1−r
Pr[B(bj · z; bj,ti ) = q]
≤ r2 max
x∈[0,B],q∈[knj +1−r,knj +1]
Pr[B(bj · z;x) = q]
By the previous lemmas, if knj ≥ 16·m
2(B+H)2r8
ǫ2δ(1−δ) + r then:
Pr
[
xji (b
j · z) 6= Xji (bj · z)
]
≤ r2 ǫ
2mr3(B +H)∣∣∣E [θknj +1(bj−i · z−i)− θknj +1(bj · z)
]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
2 · r ·m
which subsequently gives that the utility difference is at most ǫ.
B.3 Constant Inefficiency in the Limit under Supply Uncertainty
Example. Consider a simultaneous uniform price auction game with two types of goods A and
B. For each market size n, there are t = n/3 unit-demand players that have only a value of 1/2 for
each unit of good A and no value for a unit of good B, i.e. vi(xi) =
1
21{x1i ≥ 1}. We refer to these
players as type a players. There are also t unit-demand players that have value 1/2 only for units of
good B and not of good A and we refer to them as type b players. Finally, there are t unit-demand
players each having a value of 1 for each unit of each good and desiring only one unit from some
of the two goods, i.e. vi(xi) = 1{x1i + x2i ≥ 1}. We refer to them as type c players. The supply of
each good is distributed uniformly in [0, t]. Obviously, as t → ∞ this supply distribution satisfies
the property that the supply being equal to any fixed number goes to 0.
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Equilibrium. We argue that the following is an equilibrium: Each type c player picks uniformly
at random one good A or B and submits a bid of 1 at the uniform price auction for that good. Each
type a player submits a bid of 1/2 at the uniform price auction for good A and each type b player
submits a bid of 1/2 for good B.
Equilibrium verification. This is obviously an equilibrium for the type a and b players, since
they are essentially unit-demand players in a single uniform price auction, hence the mechanism is
dominant strategy truthful from their perspective. Thus it remains to argue that type c players
don’t want to bid on both items. At each item, for them to win a unit they have to bid at least 1/2,
or otherwise they will lose to the type a or type b players. Moreover, the uniform price that they
will have to pay on each good is always at least 1/2, since there are always t players bidding 1/2.
Moreover, observe that in the limit of many players we can essentially assume that exactly half of
the type c players go for item A and exactly half go for item B (in fact we could have also analyzed
the less natural equilibrium where this happens deterministically for every n, assuming n/3 is even).
A type c player’s utility at the current equilibrium strategy is 1/2 when the supply of the good that
he chose is less than or equal to t/2, since he pays 1/2, and it is 0 when the supply is more than t/2,
since he pays 1. Thus his expected utility is 1/4.
When he bids on both items, then observe that whenever he wins a unit at both auctions he has
to pay a price of 2 · 1/2, thus getting 0 utility. Thus he gets any utility only when he wins a unit at
exactly one of the two auctions and only when he wins it at a price of 1/2. There are only two possible
reasonable bids for the player 1 or 1/2. When he bids 1/2 he is tying with the type a or b players and
ties are broken at random. Let p(b) be the probability that a player wins at auction A or B with a bid
of b. Observe that p(1/2) < p(1) = 1/2. Thus if bA, bB ∈ {1/2, 1} are the bids of the player in each
auction, then his utility is: p(bA)(1− p(bB))12 + p(bB)(1− p(bA))12 = 12 (p(bA) + p(bB)− p(bA)p(bB)).
For 0 ≤ p(b) ≤ 1/2, the latter is maximized at p(bA) = p(bB) = 1/2, leading to a utility of 1/4. In
essence, the only reasonable bid of a type c player is to submit 1 on one of the two goods.
Sub-optimality. Now we argue about the suboptimality of this equilibrium as n → ∞. The
optimal allocation is to give as many units of either good A or B as possible to type c players and
all remaining units to type a or b players. There are always enough remaining type a or b players
for all units to be allocated. Thus the expected optimal welfare is:
E[Opt(kA, kB)] = E
[
min{kA + kB , t}+ 1
2
(kA + kB − t)+
]
= E
[
kA + kB − 1
2
(kA + kB − t)+
]
= t− 1
2
E
[
(kA + kB − t)+
]
= t
(
1− 1
2
E
[(
kA
t
+
kB
t
− 1
)+])
As t→∞, then kAt and kBt are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. Thus by simple integrations for two
U [0, 1] random variables x, y: E[(x+ y − 1)+] = 1/6. Hence, E[Opt(kA, kB)] ≈ 11·t12 .
On the other hand the expected welfare at equilibrium is simply:
E[SW (b)] = 2 · E
[
min{kA, t/2} + 1
2
(kA − t/2)+
]
= 2 · E
[
kA − 1
2
(kA − t/2)+
]
= t− E [(kA − t/2)+]
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For large enough t, E
[
(kA − t/2)+
] ≈ t8 . Therefore E[SW (b)] ≈ 7·t8 . Therefore, the ratio of the
expected optimal welfare over the expected equilibrium welfare converge to 2221 > 1. Hence the limit
price of anarchy is strictly greater than 1.
It is worth noting that this example can be taken to the extreme, when there are m goods, t
type c players are interested in all of the goods and each good has a set of t price setters interested
only in that good, with value 1/2. The supply of each good is distributed uniformly in
[
0, 2tm
]
. One
equilibrium is for the type c players to pick one item uniformly at random and bid 1, while the price
setting people bid truthfully on their good. As m grows large, then the total supply
∑
j kj is with
high probability concentrated around it’s expected value, which is t. Thus the expected optimal
welfare converges to t. On the other hand at equilibrium each good has approximately t/m type c
players and the supply of that good is distributed U
[
0, 2tm
]
. Thereby the expected welfare from each
good from calculation similar to the two good case, is 7t8m . Hence, the price of anarchy converges to
8/7. The essence is that bidders cannot take advantage of the concentration of total supply, which
the optimal welfare can.
C Greedy Combinatorial Auctions
As in Section 4, we consider a setting with n bidders and and a fixed number of m different (types
of) goods. For this section, we will focus on a restricted class of multi-unit single-minded valuation
functions, which take the following form: each agent i has a desired set of items Si ⊆ [m] and a
non-convex function vi : N→ [0,H], where vi(ℓ) denotes agent i’s value for receiving ℓ copies of set
Si, up to a maximum of r. Write d for the maximum size of any set Si.
The goods will be sold via a greedy auction. Bidders submit bids, in the form of a desired set
Ti and a list of marginal values b
1
i ≥ . . . ≥ bri . The bids are then considered in decreasing order.7
When a bid bℓi is considered, then one unit of each item in Ti will be allocated to player i if there are
remaining units of all items in Ti, otherwise the bid is rejected. We will write x
k
i (b) for the number
of copies allocated to player i by this auction when the supply vector is k = (k1, . . . , km).
For payments, we will charge each player i an amount, per unit of set Ti received, equal to the
largest bid that a shadow player could have placed on set Ti and been rejected. We formalize this
as follows: choose an item j, fix the quantity k−j of all other items, and imagine that there are
infinitely many copies of item j. Denote with θtj(b) the t-th highest bid for a set containing item j
that would be allocated on input b. Write θk(Ti, b) = maxj∈Ti{θkj+1j (b)}. Then player i’s payment
will be xki (b) · θk(Ti, b). The utility of a player in the greedy auction, given supply profile k, is then
un,ki (b; vi) = vi
(
xki (b)
) − xki (b) · θk(Ti, b).
We now define a version of the auction in which there is an endogenously noisy supply of items.
Definition 22. We say that the sequence of markets satisfies supply uncertainty if the quantity knj
of item j is a random variable, and moreover for any ǫ > 0 there exists some n(ǫ) such that, for all
n > n(ǫ), Pr[kj(n) = t] < ǫ for all j and all values t.
We will show that under this notion of supply uncertainty, the greedy combinatorial auction is
approximately efficient in the limit.
Theorem 23 (Approximate efficiency in the Limit). The greedy combinatorial auction under supply
uncertainty admits a (1, d)-smooth approximation in the large. In particular, if kj(n) = Ω(n) for each
item j, then the implied sequence of mechanisms is (1, d)-smooth in the large, and hence achieves a
1/d fraction of the optimal welfare.
7In the same way as in Simultaneous Uniform Price Auctions, we can handle ties in such a way that it is without
loss to assume all bids are distinct.
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One might hope to prove an analogous result to Theorem 23 under demand uncertainty as well as
under supply uncertainty. However, it turns out that under demand uncertainty, a bidder’s proposed
approximate utility and actual utility may fail to converge; see Appendix C.2 for an example. Thus,
to apply our framework to prove smoothness in the large under demand uncertainty, one would need
to find an alternate approximate utility sequence.
Sketch of proof of Theorem 23. We first define a notion of approximate utility, then establish
that this approximation satisfies the properties of a (1, d)-smooth approximation in the large. To
define the approximate utility, consider θk(Ti, b−i), which is the critical value for set Ti if agent i
were not present. Write Xki (b) = max{ℓ : bi,ℓ > θk(Ti, b−i)}. That is, Xki (b) is the number of bids
made by agent i that are strictly greater than θk(Ti, b−i). Then the approximate utility is:
Un,ki (b; vi) = vi
(
Xki (b)
) −Xki (b) · θk(Ti, b−i). (30)
This is the utility of the original game, not taking into account the effect of player i’s bid upon
the critical value of Ti. We denote by u
n
i and U
n
i the expected utility and approximate utility,
respectively, in expectation over the distribution of k.
We must show that Uni satisfies the conditions of being a (1, d)-smooth approximation to the
critical greedy auction, in the large. The fact that Uni approximates u
n
i follows from the supply
uncertainty: the variation in critical price calculation is smoothed over by uncertainty in the number
of units of each item. The smoothness condition follows in a manner similar to the Simultaneous
Uniform Price auctions: under Uni , each agent effectively views herself as a price-taker; the factor of
d is effectively due to the approximation factor of the greedy allocation algorithm.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 23
(1, d)-Smoothness of Approximate Utility. We will first show that the approximate utility Uni
satisfies the conditions of being a (1, d)-smooth approximation to the critical greedy auction, in the
large. We do this in two steps. We first show that Uni satisfies the smoothness condition with respect
to the critical greedy auction, then show that it approximates the utility of the original game.
Lemma 24. For each n, Uni satisfies the (1, d)-smoothness property with respect to the greedy critical
price auction.
Proof. Fix valuation profile v, and let x∗,k denote the welfare-optimal allocation for supply k. We
will consider the utility of agent i when declaring his true valuation vi. We have
Uni (vi, b−i; vi) = Ek
[
vi
(
Xki (vi, b−i)
)
−Xki (vi, b−i) · θk(Ti, b−i)
]
= Ek
[
r∑
ℓ=1
(
vi(ℓ)− vi(ℓ− 1)− θk(Ti, b−i)
)+]
≥ Ek
[
r∑
ℓ=1
(
vi(ℓ)− vi(ℓ− 1)− θk(Ti, b)
)+]
≥ Ek
[
vi
(
x∗,ki
)
− x∗,ki · θk(Ti, b)
]
.
Taking a sum over all i and applying linearity of expectation, we have
∑
i
Uni (vi, b−i; vi) ≥ Optn(v)− Ek
[∑
i
x∗,ki · θk(Ti, b)
]
.
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Since θk(n)(Ti, b) = maxj∈Ti θ
k
j (b) ≤
∑
j∈Ti θ
k
j (b), we have
∑
i
Uni (vi, b−i; vi) ≥ Optn(v) − Ek

∑
j
θkj (b)
∑
i:Ti∋j
x∗,ki


≥ Optn(v) − Ek

∑
j
θkj (b) · kj


≥ Optn(v) − d · Ek
[∑
i
xki (b) · θk(Ti, b)
]
= Optn(v) − d · Rn(b)
as required, where in the last inequality we made use of the fact that θk(Ti, b) ≥ 1d
∑
j∈Ti θ
k
j (b), plus
the fact that θ
k(n)
j (b) = 0 if not all copies of item j are allocated in x
k(b).
Approximation. Now we show that Uni approximates u
n
i as n grows large.
Lemma 25. For any valuation vi and for any bid profile sequence b
n:
lim
n→∞ ‖u
n
i (b
n; vi)− Uni (bn; vi)‖ = 0 (31)
Proof. This proof closely follows the proof of Lemma 9. Our goal is to find an upper bound on
‖uni (bn; vi)− Uni (bn; vi)‖. Applying the triangle inequality to the definition of uni and Uni , we have
‖uni (bn; vi)− Uni (bn; vi)‖ ≤ ‖Ek[vi(xki (b))− vi(Xki (b))]‖
+ ‖Ek[xki (b) · θk(Ti, b)−Xki (b) · θk(Ti, b−i)]‖
We’ll bound separately each of the two terms on the right hand side. The first can be bounded by
‖Ek[vi(xki (b))− vi(Xki (b))]‖ ≤ H · Pr[xki (b) 6= Xki (b)]
For the second term, we have
‖Ek[xki (b) · θk(Ti, b)−Xki (b) · θk(Ti, b−i)]‖
≤‖Ek[xki (b)(θk(Ti, b)− θk(Ti, b−i))]‖ + ‖Ek[(Xki (b)− xki (b))θk(Ti, b)]‖
≤r · ‖Ek[θk(Ti, b)− θk(Ti, b−i)]‖+H · r · Pr[xki (b) 6= Xki (b)]
Given these bounds, it suffices to show that, for all ǫ > 0, there exists an n(ǫ) such that, for all
n > n(ǫ), we have
Pr[xki (b) 6= Xki (b)] < ǫ
and
‖Ek[θk(Ti, b)− θk(Ti, b−i)]‖ < ǫ.
We will complete the proof by establishing these bounds in separate lemmas.
Lemma 26. For all ǫ > 0 there exists n(ǫ) such that for all n > n(ǫ), and all i and b, Pr[xki (b) 6=
Xki (b)] < ǫ.
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Proof. By the union bound, we have
Pr[xki (b) 6= Xki (b)] ≤
∑
j
r∑
ℓ=1
Pr[θkj (b) > bi,ℓ ≥ θkj (b−i)].
It therefore suffices to bound Pr[θkj (b) > bi,ℓ ≥ θkj (b−i)]. Fix the quantities of all items but j, and
suppose there are infinitely many units of item j. Among the marginal bids in b, consider the winning
bids for sets containing j; let (z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ) be those bids in decreasing order. Note then that
θkj (b) = zkj+1, and θ
k
j (b−i) ≥ zkj+r+1 (as agent i is allocated at most r copies of item j).
Let ℓ be the unique index such that zℓ > bi,ℓ ≥ zℓ+1. We then have
Pr[θkj (b) > bi,ℓ ≥ θkj (b−i)] ≤ Pr[ℓ+ 1 ≤ kj ≤ ℓ+ r].
The union bound combined with the definition of supply uncertainty implies that, for sufficiently
large n, this probability is at most ǫ · r. Taking an appropriate choice of ǫ completes the proof.
Lemma 27. For all ǫ > 0 there exists n(ǫ) such that, for all n > n(ǫ), and for all i, j, and b,∣∣∣Ek [θkj (b)]− Ek [θkj (b−i)]∣∣∣ < ǫ. (32)
Proof. Define values (z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ) as in Lemma 26. Recalling that θkj (b) = zkj+1 and θkj (b−i) ≥
zkj+r+1, we have ∣∣∣Ek [θkj (b)]− Ek [θkj (b−i)]∣∣∣ ≤∑
ℓ≥1
(zℓ − zℓ+r) · Pr[kj = ℓ].
Supply uncertainty implies that, for sufficiently large n, Pr[kj = ℓ] < ǫ for all ℓ and hence
∣∣∣Ek [θkj (b)]− Ek [θkj (b−i)]∣∣∣ <∑
ℓ≥1
(zℓ − zℓ+r) · ǫ ≤
r∑
ℓ=1
zℓ · ǫ < rHǫ.
Taking an appropriate choice of ǫ therefore completes the proof.
Applying Lemma 26 and Lemma 27 then completes the proof of Lemma 25.
C.2 Sensitivity of Prices to Individual Deviations under Noisy Arrival
One might hope to prove an analogous result to Theorem 23 under demand uncertainty as well
as supply uncertainty. That is, if every bidder arrives with probability (1 − δ), then is the greedy
combinatorial auction approximately efficient in the large? In this section we show a partial negative
result along these lines. In particular, we show via example that a bidder’s proposed approximate
utility and actual utility fail to converge. Thus to apply our framework to prove smoothness-in-the-
large for demand uncertainty, one would need to find an alternate approximate utility sequence.
The example consists of two items with k units each. There are 2k “large” bidders who have
a value of 1 for receiving at least one unit of each item, one bidder who has a value of b0 = 2 for
receiving at least one unit of the second item, and two bidders with values of b1 = 1/2 and b2 = 1/4
for receiving at least one unit of the first item. Consider the event that bidder 0, bidder 2, and at
least k large bidders show up. This event has probability arbitrarily close to (1 − δ)2, which is a
constant. Conditional on this event, bidder 1, using the approximate utility for the greedy auction,
27
imagines a critical price of 0 for the first item and so computes that his approximate utility is 1/2.
However, in reality, the price for the first item would be set by b2 = 1/4, and so the actual utility
that would be gained by bidder 2 is 1/4. Removing the conditioning, we see there is a constant
gap between the approximate utility and actual utility that persists even as the market grows large,
violating the conditions of an approximate utility sequence.
D Smoothness in the Large for General Games
Here we present the smoothness in the large framework for the case of cost-minimization games
(utility maximization games are a complete analogue). A cost minimization game Gn consists of
a set N of n players, a type space T n = T1 × . . . × Tn specifying a set of potential types Ti for
each player, a strategy space Sn = S1 × . . . × Sn specifying a set of potential strategies Si for each
player, and a cost function cni for each player. In an instantiation of the game, each player i has
a type ti ∈ Ti. The type of a player determines his feasible strategy space Si(ti) ⊆ Si. Write
S(t) = S1(t1)× . . .×Sn(tn) for the set of admissible strategy profiles given type profile t. The cost of
a player depends on his type and the strategies of all players, cni : S
n × Ti → ℜ, denoted as cni (s; ti).
The objective is to select an outcome that minimizes the social cost. Let SCn(s; t) denote the social
cost at strategy profile s, i.e.,
SCn(s; t) =
n∑
i=1
cni (s; ti). (33)
The optimal cost for type profile t will be denoted by Optn(t); i.e.,
Opt
n(t) = min
s∈Sn
SCn(s; t) (34)
For a fixed game Gn, we can imagine a Bayesian setting in which player types are drawn inde-
pendently from distributions; that is, for each player i there is a distribution Fi over Ti, and we
think of ti as being drawn independently from Fi. A strategy function for agent i is a (possibly
randomized) mapping from Ti to Si, which we think of as a specification of the action to use given a
type. A BNE is a profile of strategy functions such that no single agent can decrease her expected
cost (over randomization in types and strategies) by unilaterally modifying her strategy. Formally,
the profile of strategy functions µ is a BNE if for all i, all types ti, and all alternative strategies
s′i ∈ Si, we have
Et−i∼F−i [c
n
i (µi(ti), µ−i(t−i); ti)] ≤ Et−i∼F−i [cni (s′i, µ−i(t−i); ti)].
Note that the non-Bayesian notion of Nash Equilibrium is a special case of the above, in which every
distribution Fi is a point mass.
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) of game Gn is the worst-case ratio between the expected optimal
cost and the expected social cost at equilibrium, over all type distributions and all BNE. Formally,
the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of a game Gn is
BNE-PoAn = max
F
max
s
Et∼F [SCn(s(t); t)]
Et∼F [Optn(t)]
where the maximum over strategies s is taken over all BNE for distribution profile F .
Sequence of games. We will typically work with a sequence of games {Gn}∞n=1, which will intu-
itively correspond to the original game growing large. When clear in the context, we will denote the
sequence by {Gn} for the sake of brevity.
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Smoothness in the large. For finite games, Roughgarden [22] introduced the notion of smooth-
ness as a method for bounding inefficiency of equilibria. The smoothness approach proceeds by
exploring specific deviations, instead of characterizing the (potentially complex) structure of equilib-
ria. We extend the notion of smoothness to large games. Intuitively, a sequence of games is said to
be smooth in the large if there is a sequence of strategy deviations such that for any strategy profile,
as the game grows, the total cost under the proposed deviations from the strategy profile minus the
cost at that profile itself does not exceed much the optimal cost.
Definition 28 (Smooth in the large). A sequence of cost-minimization games {Gn} is (λ, µ)-smooth
in the large if for any ǫ > 0, there exists n(ǫ) <∞, such that for any n > n(ǫ), for any tn ∈ T n, for
each i ∈ [n], there exists a strategy s∗,ni ∈ Si(tni ), such that for any wn ∈ T n and sn ∈ Sn(wn):
n∑
i=1
cni (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; t
n
i ) ≤ λ(1 + ǫ)Optn(tn) + µ · SCn(sn;wn) (35)
The following theorem shows that if a sequence of cost-minimization games is (λ, µ)-smooth in
the large, for some λ ≥ 1 and µ < 1, then its price of anarchy converges to λ1−µ . Moreover, it implies
that for any sufficiently large but finite market of size n the price of anarchy of all Bayes-Nash
equilibria is at most a 1 + ǫ(n) multiplicative factor away from the limit price of anarchy, where
the rate of convergence of ǫ(n) to 0 is application specific and can be derived from the proof of
smoothness in the large.
Theorem 29. If a sequence of games is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large then
lim sup
n→∞
BNE-PoAn ≤ λ
1− µ.
I.e., for any ǫ there exists a market size n(ǫ) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), every Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the game Gn with type distributions F1 × . . . × Fn has expected social cost at most (1 + ǫ) λ1−µ
times the expected optimal cost.
Proof. By (λ, µ)-smoothness in the large, we have that for any ǫ there exists a market size n(ǫ)
such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ) the game Gn is a (λ(1 + ǫ), µ)-smooth game (in the sense of [23, 29]).
Therefore, by the results in [23, 29], the BNE-PoAn is at most (1 + ǫ) λ1−µ . The assertion of the
theorem then follows.
D.1 Main Technique: Smooth Approximate Cost Functions
We present the notion of a (λ, µ)-smooth approximate cost function sequence with respect to a
sequence of normal form games {Gn}.
Definition 30 (Smooth approximate cost). Let Cni : S
n × Ti → R+ be a cost function for player
i ∈ [n], and let Cn = (Cn1 , . . . , Cnn) be a vector of cost functions. A sequence {Cn} is a sequence
of (λ, µ)-smooth approximate cost functions for the sequence of games {Gn} if the following two
properties are satisfied:
1. (Approximation) The approximate cost Cni converges to the true cost c
n
i uniformly over
sn ∈ Sn and ti ∈ Ti. I.e., for any ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) <∞, such that for any n > n(ǫ), for any
i ∈ [n] and ti ∈ Ti, and for any sn ∈ Sn with sni ∈ Si(ti):
|cni (sn; ti)− Cni (sn; ti)| < ǫ. (36)
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2. (Smoothness) For each game Gn in the sequence, the approximate cost satisfies the following
(λ, µ)-smoothness property with respect to Gn: For any n, for any t ∈ T n, for any i ∈ [n],
there exists a strategy s∗,ni ∈ Si, such that for any type profile wn ∈ T n and any strategy profile
sn ∈ Sn(wn):
n∑
i=1
Cni (s
∗
i , s
n
−i; ti) ≤ λOptn(t) + µ · SCn(sn;wn) (37)
We show that if if a sequence of games admits a (λ, µ)-smooth approximate cost, and if its optimal
social cost increases at the same asymptotic rate as the number of players, then that sequence of
games is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large.
Theorem 31. If a sequence {Gn} of cost-minimization games admits (λ, µ)-smooth approximate
cost functions, and Optn(t) = Ω(n), then the game sequence is (λ, µ)-smooth in the large.
Proof. Since the game admits (λ, µ)-smooth approximate cost functions {Cn}, we have that for any n
and tn ∈ T n there exists strategies s∗,ni for each i ∈ [n] such that, for any wn ∈ T n and sn ∈ Sn(wn),
n∑
i=1
Cni (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; t
n
i ) ≤ λOptn(tn) + µ · SCn(sn;wn).
By the approximation property of Cni we have that for any ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) < ∞ such that for
any n > n(ǫ): cni (s; ti) ≤ Cni (s; ti) + ǫ for any ti ∈ Ti and sn ∈ Sn with si ∈ Si(ti). Thus:
n∑
i=1
cni (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; t
n
i ) ≤ λOptn(tn) + µ · SCn(sn;wn) + n · ǫ.
Since Optn(t) = Ω(n), we can write Optn(tn) ≥ ρ · n for some ρ > 0 and for sufficiently large n.
Thus we get:
n∑
i=1
cni (s
∗,n
i , s
n
−i; t
n
i ) ≤
(
λ+
ǫ
ρ
)
Opt
n(tn) + µ · SCn(sn;wn).
Therefore, for any δ > 0, we can pick ǫ appropriately small, such that λ+ ǫρ ≤ λ(1+ δ), which would
then yield the theorem.
E Congestion Games Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6 : Assuming that the cost functions are continuous, then we immediately get that
Cni satisfies the approximation requirement of a smooth approximation, since
lim
n→∞ ‖c
n
i (s; ti)− Cni (s; ti)‖ ≤ limn→∞
∑
e∈si
∥∥∥∥ce
(
ne(s−i)
n
+
1
n
)
− ce
(
ne(s−i)
n
)∥∥∥∥ = 0.
Moreover, the following calculation shows that if the edge cost-functions satisfy the property that
x · ce(y) ≤ λ · x · ce(x) + µ · y · ce(y) (38)
for all x and y, then Cni also satisfies the smoothness requirement of a smooth approximation. To
see this, take s∗,ni to be player i’s strategy in the cost-minimizing strategy profile for game G
n; we
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then have
∑
i
Cni (s
∗,n
i , s−i; ti) =
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗,ni
ce
(
ne(s−i)
n
)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈s∗,ni
ce
(
ne(s)
n
)
=
∑
e∈[m]
ne(s
∗,n)ce
(
ne(s)
n
)
≤ λ
∑
e∈[m]
ne(s
∗,n)ce
(
ne(s
∗,n)
n
)
+ µ
∑
e∈[m]
ne(s)ce
(
ne(s)
n
)
= λ ·Optn(t) + µ · SCn(s;w).
We conclude that Cni is a (λ, µ)-smooth approximate cost function, as claimed.
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